Reason, law and religious freedom

The following guest post is a lightly-edited version of a paper that first appeared on the website of the Kirby Laing Institute for Christian Ethics. Stephen Williams, Professor of Systematic Theology at Union Theological College, Belfast, explores one of the basic theoretical issues in law & religion.

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Judgement on the proper place of religious freedom in relation to law is affected by the perception of how religion stands in relation to rationality. Seven consequences of the supposition that religious belief is irrational are briefly set out, and their bearing noted on the question of conscience.

Introduction

In the contemporary debate on the law and religious freedom, ‘religion’ is often conceived in a way that prejudices the terms of the debate. This article explores the effects on our approach to the question of law and religious freedom of the assumption that religion is irrational, whether this means contrary to reason or incapable of being rationally established.[1] I shall pass over three questions: 1. how religion should be defined, whether in philosophy, theology or law; 2. how desirable a legal definition is, whether at national, European or international level; 3. what status religious liberties should have in relation to other liberties. A fourth question, indirectly related to the third, will be touched on, but not examined: the question of whether religious belief should be a protected characteristic precisely because it is religious, or because it shares relevant characteristics with non-religious moral beliefs or philosophical belief-systems that are equally entitled to protection.

‘Religion’ is here understood in its ordinary-language sense and so excludes atheism. As far as I can tell, the supposition about religious irrationality has consequences in at least seven relevant areas.

Seven consequences of viewing religion as irrational Continue reading