In Mikyas and Others v Belgium [2024] No 50681/20 [In French], three young Muslim women complained that they were not allowed to wear the hijab at secondary schools except during religious education classes. In 2009 the Education Council of the Flemish Community [Onderwijs van de Vlaamse Gemeenschap] decided to extend the ban on wearing visible symbols of one’s beliefs throughout its network, and the ban was applied to all school activities except for religious education and non-denominational ethics classes. The secondary schools attended by the applicants implemented the ban, and when they were enrolled in secondary schools, their parents signed the school regulations containing the prohibition. In 2017 their parents, as their legal representatives, brought proceedings against the Education Council, arguing breach of Article 9 ECHR. In 2018, the Tongeren Court of First Instance held that the prohibition breached Article 9 but it was reversed by the Antwerp Court of Appeal – and, on taking further legal advice, the parents decided not to appeal to the Court of Cassation.

Before the ECHR, the applicants argued that the ban infringed their rights and freedoms as guaranteed by Articles 8, 9, and 10 ECHR and Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (right to education), taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination). They also submitted that they had been discriminated against in the enjoyment of those rights.

The Court declared the part of the application which concerned Articles 8, 10 and 14 and A2P1 inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies. As to Article 9, the Court noted that, in accordance with Article 24 § 1 (3) of the Constitution, public education in the Flemish Community had to be neutral – and neutrality implied respect for the philosophical, ideological or religious convictions of parents and pupils. The prohibition did not in itself run counter to Article 9 and its underlying values, and the Court noted that the ban was not confined to the hijab but applied without distinction to any visible symbols of one’s beliefs. Further, the applicants had freely chosen to attend schools in the public education system, had been told of the rules beforehand and had agreed to abide by them.

The Court had frequently emphasised that dialogue and a spirit of compromise were necessary to democracy, and that entailed concessions by individuals in order to maintain and promote the ideals and values of a democratic society. The restriction could, therefore, be seen as proportionate to the aims pursued – the protection of the rights and freedoms of others and of public order – and therefore “necessary in a democratic society”. The complaints under Article 9 were therefore manifestly ill-founded.