

IN THE CONSISTORY COURT OF THE DIOCESE OF DURHAM

IN THE MATTER OF ST CHAD'S, BENSHAM
AND
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF SAM TAI CHAN

JUDGMENT

The Facts

1. In her petition dated the 21st June 2016 the petitioner seeks the exhumation of the remains of her late husband, Tin Fat Chan, from grave number 3825, division D, in Saltwell Cemetery, Gateshead (including all the possessions and objects from the interment) and their re-interment in what is described as “a family grave”, namely, grave number 10655, section 12LS, in Grangetown Cemetery, Sunderland. Both plots are in consecrated ground. In addition, the petition seeks the removal of the gravestone currently in place in the Saltwell Cemetery and its subsequent destruction and disposal “in a dignified and sensitive manner”. The usual consents have already been obtained.
2. The petitioner’s husband died on the 29th September 1978 and he was buried on the 2nd October 1978. Because of the lapse of time the funeral directors have drawn attention to the fact that there can be no guarantee that all the deceased’s remains can be removed from the grave; as a result it has been agreed to use a specialist team to carry out the exhumation.
3. At the time of his death the deceased had not been long in this country and, when he died, he and his wife had had no opportunity to settle into the local community. After her husband’s death the petitioner moved from Gateshead and for many years has now been resident in the area of Monkwearmouth. This has become the family home and she and her family have become stalwart members of the local Chinese Christian Church, many of whose members (as well as a number of the petitioner’s relatives) are already buried in the Grangetown Cemetery. It is her wish that on her death she will be able to join them and two plots have therefore already been purchased, one for the petitioner and the other for her husband. Thought is being given to the purchase of further plots for the next generation.
4. However, in spite of the petition’s reference to re-interment “in a family grave”, it has become apparent that any re-interment would be in a single grave next to that reserved for the petitioner. I am informed in a letter dated the 27th July 2016 from the bereavement manager dealing with matter that “according to the beliefs and tradition within the Chinese Christian community each grave is used only once”.
5. The petitioner states that, when her husband died, they had only been in this country for a short time; she was comparatively young and was unprepared for her husband’s

death. She was totally unaware and ill-informed as to the consequences of the funeral arrangements made on her behalf and even more so with regard to the regulations governing consecrated ground. She argues that the burial in Gateshead was “a mistake by virtue of mis-information and her family’s desire for a true family burial space”. However, no explanation is given as to why there has been such a long time lapse between the burial and this application.

6. The petitioner has agreed in writing to my determining this case on the basis of written representations and in accordance with rule 14.1 of the Faculty Jurisdiction Rules 2015 I have therefore ordered that the proceedings should be so determined. This is in spite of the fact that, as will become apparent, I do not find the law to be applied in reaching that determination to be straightforward.

The Law

7. The first appellate decision in relation to exhumation cases was *In re Christ Church, Alsager* [1998] 3 WLR 1394; the second was *Re Blagdon Cemetery* [2002] Fam 299; and the third was *Re St Nicholas, Sevenoaks* [2005] 1 WLR 1011. The first was a decision of the Chancery Court and the other two were decisions of the Arches Court of Canterbury.
8. (i) Precedent: The diocese of Durham is one of twelve dioceses comprising the province of York. In cases not involving matters of doctrine, ritual or ceremonial appeals in faculty cases from the consistory courts of these dioceses lie to the Chancery Court of York (hereafter “the Chancery Court”), whereas such appeals from consistory courts of dioceses lying within the province of Canterbury are to the Arches Court of Canterbury (hereafter “the Court of Arches”): see the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963, section 7(1)(b). Appeals from consistory courts in either province in faculty cases involving matters of doctrine, ritual or ceremonial lie to the Court of Ecclesiastical Causes Reserved: see the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963, section 10(1). The Chancery Court of York and the Court of Arches therefore have no jurisdiction to determine matters of doctrine, ritual or ceremonial. It was for this reason that it was necessary in the cases of *In re Christ Church, Alsager* at page 1398C and *In re St Alkmund, Duffield* [2013] Fam 158 at paragraph 23 for the Chancery Court and the Court of Arches respectively to determine that no matter of doctrine, ritual or ceremonial actually arose in those appeals as had, indeed, been certified by the courts from which the appeals were being brought. (The importance of this will be made clear later in this judgment.) Nevertheless, some confusion may have arisen by reason of both courts stating their views *obiter* on related doctrinal questions: see *Alsager* at page 1398C-D (“In other words [the archdeacon’s] evidence underscored the theological reason for the protective jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts in consecrated ground.”) and *Duffield* at paragraph 173B-C (The need for appeals in cases of ritual, doctrine and ceremonial to be made to the Court of Ecclesiastical Causes Reserved “does not ... mean that this court does not have

jurisdiction to determine the legal meaning of the revised Canons of the Church of England, Canon C 15(1) of which is concerned with the Declaration of Assent”).

9. By reason of these separate, concurrent or co-ordinate appellate jurisdictions the question arises as to how the rules of precedent apply within the two provinces and the law is set out by Professor Norman Doe in *The Legal Framework of the Church of England* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996) at page 156:

“The decisions of provincial courts bind only in that province. The Arches Court is not bound by the decisions of the Chancery Court, nor is the Chancery Court bound by the Arches Court’s decisions. The Arches Court is bound by its own previous decisions, as is the Chancery Court. Decisions of the Arches Court bind consistory courts only in the Province of Canterbury; those of the Chancery Court bind consistory courts only in the York Province.”

The same position is set out in 34 *Halsbury’s Laws of England* (Lexis Nexis, 2011) at paragraph 1032 and is no more than the usual position vis-à-vis courts of concurrent jurisdictions. It is true that in *Re St Mary, Tyne Dock (No. 2)* [1958] P 156 at 159 Deputy Chancellor Wigglesworth observed that, although a judgment of the Arches Court is not a binding authority in the province of York, it is naturally treated with the greatest of respect (in particular because the judge of the two provincial courts is required by statute to be the same person); nevertheless, if a decision of the Arches Court criticises or disapproves of a decision of the Chancery Court, it is clear from the law that presently applies that it cannot actually overrule that decision¹. Moreover, 34 *Halsbury’s Laws of England* states the view (at paragraph 1032, note 7) that the present state of the law “would seem to be unaffected by the fact that the Dean no longer sits alone”. Indeed, if the situation were otherwise, the long accepted doctrine of precedent as set out by Professor Doe and in *Halsbury’s Laws of England* would have been set aside but by or with no statutory or judicial authority.

10. In spite of this, in Hill *Ecclesiastical Law* (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed., 2007) at paragraph 1.34, having acknowledged that “decisions of the Court of Arches and those of the Chancery Court [are not] strictly binding on one another, they being of co-ordinate jurisdiction”, the author continues:

“In recent years ... the strict rules of precedent have been tempered by an increasing pragmatism in producing homogeneity in judicial decisions both at first instance and in the two appeal courts. A number of factors have led to this: first the increase in the reporting of decisions; secondly the borrowing of reasoning and the application of guidelines enunciated in consistory courts of

¹*In the Matter of a Petition by Mrs Mary Rhead* [2016] ECC Swk 7 (a decision of the consistory court of Southwark in the southern province) Chancellor Petchey, who had been one of the counsel to appear before the appellate court in *Blagdon* said that “The authority of *In re Christ Church Alsager* was dented in *In re Blagdon Cemetery*.”) This comment was, of course, an *obiter dictum* and, even if it is correct that the authority has been dented (but see later in this judgment), it can only be dented in so far as its authority in the southern province is concerned.

other dioceses; thirdly the adoption and approval by appeal courts of first instance decisions; fourthly the change in composition of the Court of Arches in faculty appeals into a body comprising the Dean of the Arches together with two diocesan chancellors; and fifthly the *de facto* elision of the Court of Arches and Chancery Court of York into what is effectively a single court of appeal for both provinces.”

However, only Professor Hill’s fourth and fifth points are relevant to the present case and, as has been seen, *Halsbury’s Laws of England* sets out a different view as to the author’s fourth point². That apart, there can be no single court of appeal for both provinces (whether *de facto* or otherwise) for cases not involving doctrine, ritual or ceremonial unless, and until, the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 has been amended. In addition and however inconvenient it may seem, in the meantime the present law as to precedent remains until it is overruled by higher authority or by legislation (cp) the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963, sections 45(3) and 48(5)(6).

11. In *Re St Nicholas, Sevenoaks* [2005] 1 WLR 1011 at pages 1014H-1015C the Arches Court stated:

“So far as decisions of the Court of Arches and the Chancery Court of York are concerned we take this opportunity to approve the approach of the chancellor of the diocese of Newcastle in *Re Hing Lo, decd* (unreported) 26 June 2002 where McLean Ch said, at para 12, said that, having regard to the fact that all chancellors are judges of each court and the office of Dean of the Arches and Auditor are by statute held by the same person it is realistic to treat ‘the Arches Court of Canterbury and the Chancery Court of York as being for the purposes of the doctrine of precedent, two divisions of a single court’. Accordingly consistory courts in each Province should have regard to decisions of an appellate court, whether or not given in their Province, and a later decision should prevail if it differs from that given in an earlier decision irrespective of the Province concerned.”

However, not only was this observation clearly unnecessary to the matter to be determined and was therefore an *obiter dictum*, but, being a decision of the Arches Court, it cannot in law or in logic overturn the rules of precedent at least in so far as the Chancery Court is concerned, however inconvenient the result may be. Indeed, such an observation was strictly *ultra vires* in so far as the Chancery Court was concerned and, to take it to its logical conclusion, would mean that each appellate court might otherwise overrule the other appellate court even though (as has been seen) those courts are themselves bound by their own decisions. To take the opposing view is to drive a coach and horses through the long accepted rules of precedent within the hierarchy of the ecclesiastical courts. Indeed, the result of the observation, if of legal authority, would in practice result in a merging of the two appellate courts and be contrary to the provisions of section 1(2) of the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction

² In relation to precedent neither refers to the case of *Re St Nicholas, Sevenoaks* [2005] 1 WLR 1011.

Measure 1963. Such a result can only be achieved by a Measure passed by the General Synod or by other legislative authority.

12. Indeed, in *Blagdon* itself [at paragraph 36(v)] the Arches Court considered the application of the principle of precedent in so far as it applied to consistory courts and concluded:

“In our view, precedent has practical application at the present day because of the desirability of securing equality of treatment, so far as circumstances permit it, as between petitioners.”

If the application of precedent is confirmed in relation to one level of ecclesiastical courts, it is difficult to see how the application of precedent to higher ecclesiastical courts can be set aside without at least an in depth consideration of the principles involved.

13. (ii) Recent Cases in the Northern Province: In *Re Quoc Tru Tran Deceased* [2016] ECC Man 2 (a decision of the consistory court of Manchester) Chancellor Tattersall QC considered the decisions of both appellate courts and also noted [at paragraph 10] that in *Re Blagdon* “the Arches Court of Canterbury observed that there were practical difficulties with the test formulated in *Re Christ Church Alsager*”. He continued with a quotation from the former case [at paragraph 33]:

“We have concluded that there is much to be said for reverting to the straightforward principle that a faculty for exhumation will only be exceptionally granted. Exceptional means ‘forming an exception’ ... and guidelines can assist in identifying various categories of exception. Whether the facts in a particular case warrant a finding that the case is to be treated as an exception is for the chancellor to determine on a balance of probabilities.”

The chancellor then went on explicitly [at paragraph 18] to apply the *Blagdon* principles without considering any question of precedent. I comment that the test laid down in *Alsager* will in many (if not most) cases lead to the same conclusion as would be reached in applying the *Blagdon* approach and this seems implicitly to be recognised by the Arches Court in *Re St Nicholas, Sevenoaks* when it said [at page 1014H]:

“Much of what was said in the decision of the Chancery Court of York [in] *In re Christ Church, Alsager* was followed in the *Blagdon* case.”

However, it is possible that the test laid down in *Alsager* may in a few cases be slightly less draconian in its application from the petitioner’s point of view. That test is:

“Is there a good and proper reason for exhumation, that reason being likely to be regarded as acceptable by right thinking members of the Church at large?”
[see *Alsager* at 1401D-E]

14. In *In the Matter of a Petition by Kevin Shek* [2016] ECC New 2 (a decision of the consistory court of Newcastle) Deputy Chancellor Wood stated [at paragraph 8]:

“The law is well established and definitely set out in the judgment of the Court of Arches *In re Blagdon Cemetery*. The presumption of permanence is explained, arising, as it does, from the Christian theology of burial which emphasises, by reference to the Bishop of Stafford’s *Theology of Burial*, that the permanent burial of the physical body is to be seen as a symbol of the entrusting the person to God for resurrection, a concept that does not sit easily with the concept of ‘portable remains’. Hence the reluctance of the Consistory Court to grant faculties for exhumation is well supported by Christian theology.”

The deputy chancellor set out the same approach, and in exactly the same words, in *In the matter of a Petition by Mrs Anne King* [2016] ECC New 3. In neither case was any consideration given to *Alsager* or to the question of precedent.

15. In *In the Matter of Cyril Jones (Dec’d)* [2016] ECC Liv 4 (a decision of the consistory court of Liverpool) Chancellor Sir Mark Hedley stated that he “must follow the guidance laid down by the ecclesiastical appellate courts” _ an acknowledgment of the binding force of precedent _ but then went on to summarise the position: “In short I may only allow an exhumation in exceptional cases.” The chancellor cited no cases and therefore side stepped any consideration of the matters of precedent referred to above although he seems, in practice, to have followed the case of *Alsager*.

16. The most recent case in the northern province is that of *In the matter of St Michael and St Lawrence, Fewston* [2016] ECC Lee 7 (a decision of the consistory court of Leeds) where 154 bodies had been exhumed without legal authority. Chancellor Hill QC stated [at paragraph 7]:

“The faculty jurisdiction is not some limpid simulacrum of the secular planning system, which it predates by many centuries. It is a vibrant functioning expression of the ecclesiology of the Church of England which helps to facilitate its mission and witness as the church of the nation. A key function of the consistory court is the maintenance of Christian doctrine. If there is to be a departure from the theology of the permanence of Christian burial, it should only be after careful consideration, which should invariably precede any disinterment: see *Re Christ Church, Alsager* ... and its development in the southern province in *Re Blagdon*.”

It follows that, although he says nothing explicit about questions of precedent, the Chancellor acknowledges the continuing different appellate jurisdictions between the two provinces and accepts the continuing authority of *Alsager*.

17. (iii) *Re Blagdon Cemetery*: Before considering the criticism made of *Alsager*, it is necessary to consider the authority of *Blagdon* itself. As I have already noted, neither the Arches Court nor the Chancery Court have any jurisdiction in matters of doctrine, ritual or ceremonial. In *Blagdon* the Arches Court stated [at paragraph 22] that

“exhumation cases do not ‘involve a question of doctrine, ritual or ceremonial’” and went on to acknowledge that Chancellor Briden (the diocesan chancellor at first instance) had “correctly so certified in this case”. However, in spite of this statement the court considered that _

“a summary of the theological principles can be usefully stated here so as to promote a better understanding of the theological reason for the approach taken by the Consistory Courts to applications for exhumation from consecrated land.”

To this end the Court asked the Bishop of Stafford (as he then was) to provide “a paper on the ‘Theology of Burial’” [see paragraph 23], although the bishop was not called to give evidence and was not cross-examined as to his views; as a result it is unclear what evidential status such a paper had in the proceedings. Nonetheless, not only was such an active consideration of the theological position *ultra vires* but, as the Arches Court implicitly acknowledged, any determination of the theological position would necessarily be *obiter dicta*. Such an investigation into the theological position was properly one for the Court of Ecclesiastical Causes Reserved.

18. A “slightly expanded” copy of the bishop’s paper appears under the heading *A Note on the Theology of Burial in relation to some Contemporary Questions* appears in (2003-2004) 7 Ecc LJ at 447 but, if there had been any cross-examination of the bishop, any such additions would presumably have been ventilated. However, because of this expansion, it is unfortunate that in the judgment only two quotations are included [at paragraph 23] from the bishop’s paper although with apparent approval. Nevertheless, the first of these quotations makes it clear that the case of *Re Talbot* [1901] P 1 (a case in the London consistory court) was referred to. In that case a body that had been buried for 110 years was permitted to be exhumed so that it might be reburied with other past superiors of a Roman Catholic theological college although in *Blagdon* no comment is made as to whether the court regarded it as properly decided.
19. However, at the end of the day and in spite of the *ultra vires* active consideration of the theology of burial, the theological exegesis was unnecessary to the decision in *Blagdon*, although the fact that it was made at all may well raise questions as to the overall authority of that decision. This is the more so when chancellors may be tempted to regard the decision as based on the theology that is there set out: see, for example, the cases of *In the Matter of a Petition by Kevin Shek* and *In the matter of a Petition by Mrs Anne King* already referred to.
20. Whatever be the case, any theology in relation to the permanence of a deceased’s burial place is tempered by the exceptions that are introduced whether in relation to community projects (such as road widening schemes) and the need for more burial spaces (such as exhumations for re-interment in family graves). Moreover, the latter exception has in its practical application tended to undermine the basic exceptionality test propounded in *Blagdon* itself.

21. (iv) Criticism of *Alsager*: In *Re Blagdon* the court stated [at paragraph 30]:
- “Both [counsel] have argued in this Court that the reference to right thinking members of the Church at large is an extremely difficult test to apply in practice. The Chancellor may consider that evidence ought to be taken on the matter. It could then transpire that there are different views that are honestly and rationally held upon the subject of exhumation. If the Chancellor does not take evidence, then an assumption has to be made as to the notional views of right thinking members of the Church at large. For a petitioner the test may give the impression that mustering support for the petition is the way to persuade the Court that exhumation would be acceptable within the notional body of right thinking members of the Church at large for the reason relied upon in the petition.”

Having expressed the view that the difficulty in applying the *Alsager* test was exemplified in the case before it, the Court continued [at paragraph 33]:

“We conclude that there is much to be said for reverting to the straightforward principle that a faculty for exhumation will only exceptionally be granted.”

22. I note that the Arches Court, though finding difficulty in applying the *Alsager* test, did not purport to set it aside other than, perhaps, in relation to the southern province. In any event and for the reasons I have already set out, in so far as the northern province the *Alsager* test still prevails. Nonetheless, in the light of the criticisms in *Blagdon* I note that the civil courts have had no difficulty in applying the approach of the equally notional man on the Clapham omnibus (see *McQuire v Western Morning News* [1903] 2 KB 100 at 109 *per* Collins MR) or of the right thinking members of society, the officious bystander, the reasonable landlord and the fair minded and informed observer (see *Healthcare at Home Ltd v The Common Services Agency* [2014] UKSC 49 at paragraphs 1-4). Indeed, in the *Healthcare at Home* case the Supreme Court explained [at paragraph 2] that these legal fictions _

“belong to an intellectual tradition of defining a legal standard by reference to a hypothetical person, which stretches back to the creation of the Roman jurists of the figure of the *bonus paterfamilias*.”

For this reason no evidence can be called in civil cases as to how such a hypothetical person would respond to the situation under consideration and, as the ecclesiastical law is part of the general law of England, there seems to be no reason why a “right thinking member of the [Anglican] Church” should not be approached in a similar, hypothetical way.

23. Application of the *Alsager* test to the present case: Even though the *Alsager* test may in some few instances be more flexible than that outlined in *Blagdon*, as the Arches Court in *Re St Nicholas, Sevenoaks* recognised [at page 1014H]:

“Much of what was said in the decision of the Chancery Court of York [in] *In re Christ Church, Alsager* was followed in the *Blagdon* case.”

That being so, the various guidelines considered by the Arches Court would seem to be of assistance when applying the *Alsager* test: see, too, the approach of Chancellor Hill in *In the matter of St Michael and St Lawrence, Fewston* (above) and his statement concerning the “development” of *Alsager* in the case of *Blagdon*. To put it another way, the guidelines are examples of what would be regarded as “acceptable by right thinking members of the Church at large”. This is the more so when the court in *Blagdon* makes it clear that its “guidelines” do no more than “assist in identifying various categories of exception” to the general principle of permanence of burials [see *Blagdon* at 33]. Similarly, decisions in other cases in either province may give guidance without ever amounting to binding precedents. (A useful summary of recent cases may be found in the case of *Re Astwood Cemetery* (2014)³ although it is unfortunately not reported.)

24. As is pointed out in *Alsager* [at page 1401H] “the passage of a substantial period of time will argue against a grant of a faculty” but that fact is not determinative: see, also, *Alsager* at paragraph 36(iii). Here the deceased was buried almost 38 years ago and this is clearly a substantial period. The petitioner, however, argues that her decision to bury her husband in Gateshead was “a mistake by virtue of mis-information”. Nonetheless, in essence this is saying no more than that she would in retrospect have made a different decision and the court in *Alsager* said [at page 1402A]:

“If there is no ground other than that the petitioner has moved to a new area and wishes the remains also to be removed this is *likely* to be an inadequate reason.” [emphasis supplied]

(I note that *Blagdon* interprets this passage in a rather more robust fashion [at paragraph 36(iii)]: “We ... agree [with the Chancery Court of York] that a change of mind as to the place of burial on the part of relatives ... *should not* be treated as an acceptable ground for authorising exhumation.” [emphasis supplied])

However, the present case is not an example of what has been called “a portable remains” case as it is motivated by the “family’s desire for a true family burial space” and is more akin to the family grave cases referred to in *Blagdon* [at paragraph 36(vi)]; nevertheless, it is different in that for cultural reasons there is here no proposal of other family members being buried in the same grave.

25. Nonetheless, I have already noted the case of *Re Talbot* where a body that had been buried for 110 years was permitted to be exhumed so that it might be reburied in unconsecrated ground with other past superiors of a Roman Catholic theological

³ At paragraph 36 of the judgment Chancellor Mynors comments; “... it has probably always been assumed that a faculty is required for exhumation” In fact, it was a common law misdemeanour to carry out an exhumation without lawful authority (see *R v Lynn* (1788) 2 TR 733 and *R v Sharpe* (1857) Dears & B 160). Since 1857 that authority for exhumation from consecrated ground rested primarily with the consistory courts: see section 25 of the Burial Act 1857 and Fellows *The Law of Burial* (London, 1940) at page 119. See, too, *Inn the matter of St Michael and St Lawrence, Fewston* [2016] ECC Lee 7. Since the passing of section 2 of the Church of England (Miscellaneous Provisions) Measure 2014 the jurisdiction is exclusively that of the consistory courts.

college. I have also noted the case of *Re Quoc Tru Tran Deceased* although the facts are a little different from those in the present case. In *Re Quoc Tru Tran Deceased* the deceased, who was also of Chinese descent, sought from the beginning to be “interred near to some Chinese Graves” [see paragraph 3.2]; the family were new immigrants; they were unaware of the burial being in consecrated ground or its implications and had little understanding of this country’s “practices and customs”; in addition, the deceased and his wife were practising Buddhists. In these circumstances Chancellor Tattersall QC commented [at paragraphs 17-18]:

“I am satisfied that it would be extraordinarily harsh for me to apply ... Christian theology to a practising Buddhist where the sole purpose is to exhume the Deceased, cremate his remains and have them stored with those of his wife at the Buddhist Temple I am thus wholly satisfied that this is an exceptional case where, pursuant to the principles set out in *In re Blagdon* I should grant the faculty sought on the basis of mistake and in the exercise of my general discretion as to the granting of a faculty.”

26. The last two cases referred to are not on all fours with the present one and I am by no means sure that, if I were applying the *Blagdon* approach (even though those are guidelines), I would reach the same conclusion in favour of exhumation. Nonetheless, for the reasons I have outlined at some length, I have concluded that the test that I should adopt is that laid down in *Alsager*, although bearing in mind the presumption of permanence in relation to any burial.
27. In the result I have concluded that the different ethnic approach to burial within the Chinese Christian Church provides a good and proper reason for exhumation, that reason being likely to be regarded as acceptable by (hypothetical) right thinking members of the Church at large. If my decision were otherwise, the Chinese Christian Church might well feel deeply aggrieved that exhumations may be allowed for non-Chinese Christians for burial in family surroundings (albeit in one grave) while for cultural reasons that possibility is denied to their own community; in my view the right thinking Anglican would regard such a situation to be divisive of the Church at large and therefore to be avoided if at all possible. Moreover, in the circumstances I do not regard the lapse of time as determinative; in so deciding I bear in mind the lack of guarantee about recovering all the remains but I also bear in mind that a specialist firm is to carry out the work and that, depending upon ground conditions, such a guarantee may often not be possible. I therefore direct that a faculty should issue for exhumation on the usual terms.

The Reverend and Worshipful Rupert Bursell QC
Chancellor of the Diocese of Durham
30th August 2016