And here’s one we should have made earlier…

In Mr R Daudet v Computacenter (UK) Limited [2024] 2301071/2023, Mr Daudet claimed unfair dismissal under s.98 Employment Rights Act 1996; direct discrimination because of race and/or religion or belief under s.13 Equality Act 2020, harassment related to race and/or religion or belief under s.26 Equality Act, and breach of contract [1]. In brief, Computacenter said that the reason for his dismissal was that he had harassed a female employee [3].

Mr Daudet claimed that he had not harassed the female employee; instead, he had been dismissed because he had expressed a religious belief in dreams/premonitions to said female employee – which did not amount to harassment. He had therefore been directly discriminated against by being subjected to disciplinary proceedings and dismissed. He further claimed that he had been subject to harassment related to his being black and/or his religious belief in dreams/premonitions. He argued that no reasonable employer would summarily dismiss someone for expressing religious or philosophical beliefs. He also believed that his dismissal had been automatically unfair because the principal reason for it was that he had asserted a statutory right to express his religious belief in dreams/premonitions [4].

The focus of interest for this blog is the religious discrimination claim. On that issue, Computacenter (UK) argued [181] that Mr Daudet’s asserted beliefs failed the five tests set out by Burton J in Grainger plc and Ors v Nicholson [2009] UKEAT 0219_09_0311 at para [24].

The Employment Tribunal agreed:

“183. We understand from the legal principles that beliefs that have a narrow focus may be excluded if they are parochial rather than fundamental. The subject matter of the belief in question must be of some general importance. While it is accepted that people of different religions and beliefs worldwide believe in the power of dreams, the Belief is expressed to be that the claimant believes in prophetic dreams that predict the future and he is gifted with that psychic ability and that the majority, although in evidence he said all, of his dreams come true.

184. We understand the Belief he is seeking to rely on is very specifically about his own gift. We are satisfied that it would not gain protection merely because it was connected to any Christian belief. We conclude that that is a narrowly focused belief and is not of general importance as it concerns an individual’s belief in his own particular abilities and no more than that. We do not consider that it meets the test set out in case law as Grainger iii.

185. We would not need to go any further to consider Grainger iv but were invited to go further in case we were wrong in any of our conclusions. We understand that the fourth Grainger criterion is that the Belief must have a similar status and cogency to a religious belief. While it doesn’t have to govern every aspect of an individual’s life, it must be a fully-fledged system of thought. On the claimant’s own evidence, the Belief does not influence his conduct at work and has a small impact on his conduct outside of work, as he shares his dreams only on a very limited basis. We would also find that it does not meet this criterion. We conclude that the Belief does not qualify as a philosophical belief under the Equality Act. Even if, which we do not accept, the claimant’s Belief motivated the respondent, it is not a protected characteristic.

186. The claimant also relies on his Christian faith, and we have found that the decision-maker was unaware of it. It therefore could play no part in what happened.

187. We conclude for these reasons that any claim based on either Belief or Christian faith cannot succeed on these facts.”

Dream on…