In R v Hamit Coskun [2025] Southwark Crown Court 10 October, Mr Coskun appealed against his conviction for an offence under s.5 Public Order Act 1986, enhanced by the aggravation provisions of s.31 Crime and Disorder Act 1998: setting fire to a copy of the Quran outside the Turkish Consulate in London. The appeal was heard by Bennathan J, sitting with two lay magistrates.
Background
Mr Coskun is a Turkish national and an asylum seeker [21]. On 13 February 2025, he set fire to a copy of the Quran outside the Turkish Consulate in London, shouting, “Koran is burning”, “Fuck Islam”, and “Islam is the religion of terrorism” [1, 21 & 22] and was attacked by Moussa Kadri, who chased him brandishing a knife. When he fell to the ground, Mr Kadri kicked him and spat at him, while a passing delivery driver also kicked him and then cycled away. [23]. Both men were arrested; Mr Kadri was later convicted of assault and possessing a knife and sentenced to a suspended term of imprisonment [24], while Mr Coskun was convicted of the racially aggravated form of the s.5 offence and fined [27].
The arguments on appeal
It was submitted on Mr Coskun’s behalf that his conduct did not reach the level required to amount to “disorderly conduct”. Though it may have upset at least one person, it did not meet the legal test of “likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress” and, given the political nature of his protest, the Court should find his conduct “reasonable”. Finally, though his conduct may have been motivated by hostility to Islam, the Court should recognise and honour the distinction which he drew between a hostility to a faith and a hostility to the adherents to that religion [31].
The Prosecution accepted that there was no law criminalising blasphemy, but submitted that burning the Quran in the knowledge that it would upset any Muslim, together with the shouted comments, was an ample basis for the Court to find the offence proved in its aggravated form. Further, Mr Kadri’s reaction, however deplorable and unlawful, showed that people were indeed distressed by Mr Coskun’s conduct [32].
The judgment
At the beginning of his judgment, Bennathan J set out what he described at [1] as some “clear and well-established propositions in the law of England and Wales”.
“2. There is no offence of blasphemy in our law. Burning a Koran [sic] may be an act that many Muslims find desperately upsetting and offensive. The criminal law, however, is not a mechanism that seeks to avoid people being upset, even grievously upset. The right to freedom of expression, if it is a right worth having, must include the right to express views that offend, shock or disturb.
3. We live in a liberal democracy. One of the precious rights that affords us is to express our own views and read, hear and consider ideas without the state intervening to stop us doing so. The price we pay for that is having to allow others to exercise the same rights, even if that upsets, offends or shocks us.
4. The criminal courts will interfere to protect people. A person who acts so as to cause harassment, alarm or distress to another may commit an offence.
5. These propositions have been articulated in numerous decisions of the appellate Courts, both domestic and in the European Court of Human Rights (see, as examples, Handyside v UK (1976) 1 EHRR 737, DPP v Redmond-Bate [1999] Crim L R 998 and Campaign Against Antisemitism v DPP [2019] EWHC 9 (Admin)). These rights, and that balance, are the bedrock of the English common law and the rights encapsulated in the European Convention of Human Rights…”
At [33], he set out a series of questions which the Court believed it had to answer:
“(1) Has the Prosecution made us sure the Defendant used threatening or abusive words or behaviour, or disorderly behaviour? If the answer is “no”, the Defendant’s appeal must be allowed. If “yes”, we need to consider the next question.
(2) Has the Prosecution made us sure the Defendant did so in the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress thereby. If the answer is “no”, the Defendant’s appeal must be allowed. If “yes” we need to consider the next question.
(3) Has the Prosecution made us sure the Defendant intended his behaviour to be, or was aware that it may be, disorderly. If the answer is “no”, the Defendant’s appeal must be allowed. If “yes” we need to consider the next question.
(4) Has the Defendant persuaded us it is more likely than not that he had no reason to believe that there was any person within hearing or sight who was likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress, or that his conduct was reasonable. If the answer is “yes”, we must allow the appeal. If “no” we need to consider the final question.
(5) Are we sure the Defendant demonstrated towards the victim of the offence hostility based on the victim’s membership or presumed (by the Defendant) membership of a racial or religious group or that the offence is motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility towards members of a racial or religious group based on their membership of that group. If the answer is “yes” we must convict the Defendant of the racially aggravated form of the offence. If the answer is “no” we must convict the Defendant of the simple section 5 offence.”
The Court concluded as follows:
First, Mr Coskun’s conduct was not aimed at a person. A generalised protest might amount to an offence under s.5, but it was less likely to do so than one where the conduct or words were directed at a person or people [35].
Second, the location was outside the Turkish Consulate. Embassies or consulates were recognised locations for political protests against the policies of those countries. “A protest outside someone’s home or a place of worship might well create an anticipation that those who witness it may feel vulnerable and, very easily, become harassed, alarmed or distressed. A protest outside a secure and recognised location for such activities, less so” [36].
Third, Mr Coskun was by himself [37].
Fourth, “it was daylight. Any passerby could clearly see that the Defendant was stood by himself, empty-handed save for the book he then set alight” [38]
Fifth, “his protest was of short duration, perhaps two or three minutes” [39].
Sixth, the reaction of the people present was not determinative:
“The section 5 offence criminalises the effect of conduct that is likely, not that which actually transpires. Yet the reactions of those who witness the event in real time can be relevant in that it allows a Court, who inevitably view the events at a distance, some insight into the sound, feel and appearance of the impugned conduct. For a moment we leave aside the criminal conduct of Kadri and the delivery rider. In our view it is significant that in the three minutes or so of film that we have watched, a number of people wander by. As things develop, two or three people stop to watch. There is no sense that any of the passers-by or spectators feel sufficiently alarmed to hurry away or even cross the road. They see a man, by himself, on a fairly empty pavement, who shouts and sets fire to a book … their casual reactions to the Defendant’s conduct are not determinative, but they are telling” [40].
Seventh, Mr Kadri and the delivery cyclist may very well have felt insulted, but that was no longer a basis for the s.5 offence. Mr Kadri may well have grown very angry, but being angry was not the same as being harassed, alarmed or distressed [41].
It followed that the Prosecution had not demonstrated satisfactorily either that Mr Coskun’s conduct could properly be found to be disorderly or that it was within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress thereby. Appeal allowed [42].
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Joshua Rozenberg comments on the case in the Law Society Gazette, here and Rosalind English comments in the UK Human Rights Blog, here.