In Greater Glasgow Health Board & Anor [2026] CSOH 76, Greater Glasgow Health Board petitioned the court to exercise its parens patriae jurisdiction in the case of Child A and Child B, while Borders Health Board petitioned the court to exercise it in respect of Child C. All three were the children of Jehovah’s Witnesses, and none had the capacity to consent on their own account. Child A’s and Child B’s parents had refused permission for blood transfusions, while the parents of Child C had refused permission for an anti-tetanus vaccination after she had been bitten by the family dog [1].

Lord Braid noted at [16] that Lady Tait had recently summarised the current law on the exercise of parens patriae in A Scottish Health Board, Petitioner [2026] SLT 71, as follows:

• the Court of Session can authorise treatment for a person, including a child, who does not have capacity and who cannot consent to medical treatment;
• it may do so where such treatment is in the best interests of the person;
• such authority has the same effect in law as consent provided by the person (or, in the case of a child, a parent);
• there is a strong presumption that it is in a person’s best interests to stay alive; and
• though the religious views of the child or parents are a factor which may be taken into account, they do not carry pre-eminent weight.

Lady Tait had not addressed whether the child had to be an orphan for the parens patriae jurisdiction to apply; for his part, however, though to be orphaned was a sufficient reason for the court to step in and give parental consent where required, he could “see no reason either in logic, or in law, why it should also be a necessary one” [20].

Because exercising the jurisdiction interfered with family life, any authorisation had to be proportionate to a material risk, and when considering whether to exercise the jurisdiction, the court had to balance the welfare of the child against other considerations, including the parents’ wishes and religious beliefs and their right to parental autonomy [20].

In the cases of Child A and Child B, “stated bluntly, there was a risk of the child dying if the orders were not granted: it would be unsatisfactory if the Court of Session were not entitled to make an order in such circumstances” [22]. Child C’s case was much more finely balanced. There was “a greater than negligible risk” that she might contract tetanus if not vaccinated [26] and if she did so she would suffer serious harm [27]. It was therefore in her interests to be given the necessary vaccines [29].

Ross McCormick notes the case in Scottish Legal News at greater length, here.