Conflict over actions within the Church of England covers a broad spectrum, from objections raised within the consistory courts to proceedings for assent on the appointment of clergy. Dioceses such as Lichfield have specific policies to address persistent, unreasonable and/or vexatious complaints, and the forthcoming Clergy Conduct Measure includes a dedicated system for handling vexatious complaints[1], including the power to impose restraint orders[2]. The following gobbets are from examples reported to date in L&RUK, and included in our Index. This will be updated in the light of future discussion and case law.
Complaint against Archbishop of Canterbury dismissed. A review of Re: the Most Revd & Right Hon Sarah Mullally, Archbishop of Canterbury, Review Decision pursuant to section 13(3), February 2026; and President’s Decision on Publication, (March 2026). The President noted the restraining order against the complainant (at [8]), and analysed the complaints making reference to their vexatious nature (1 in February ’26 and 4 in March ’26), although he did not refer to “N”, as a vexatious complainant. (12 March 2026).
Confirmation of Archbishop of Canterbury – Legal Ceremony. Since the consecration of the Rt Rev Libby Lane at York Minster in January 2015, these services have attracted a degree of disruption by protestors. On 21 May 2018, we considered the protests at the installation of Rt Revd Sarah Mullally to the See of London based on objections to consecration of women as bishops.
Subsequently, during the legal proceedings on the installation of Sarah Mullally as Archbishop of Canterbury on 28 January 2026, a protest was raised relating to the handling of a safeguarding issue by the Rt Revd Mullally; the Archbishop of York announced that a “full opportunity” had been given for lawful objections, but none had been received and the installation would therefore continue.
Beyond the service itself, Conservative Anglican groups, especially in parts of Africa and the Global South, have expressed strong objections to Mullally’s leadership, on grounds that she is a woman and also because of broader concerns over theological direction and biblical interpretation. (30 January 2026).
“Sufficient interest” in faculty petitions. The otherwise unremarkable case Re St Lawrence Toot Baldon [2023] ECC Oxf 10 concerning a confirmatory faculty for an unauthorized ledger stone, explored the issue of “sufficient interest” in faculty petitions – an issue on which there was “surprisingly little authority”. The Deputy Chancellor (at [30]) cited the judgment of Lord Reed, in the Supreme Court, in Walton v The Scottish Ministers [2012] UKSC 44, [2013] PTSR 51 (at paragraph 92) in which he drew a distinction between ‘the mere busybody and the person affected by or having a reasonable concern in the matter to which the application relates’. However, he noted at [31]: …Because of [a] longstanding friendship with the person commemorated by the memorial I cannot regard her as a ‘mere’ – still less as a ‘vexatious’ – ‘busybody’. (15 January 2024).
Williamson v The Bishop of London & Ors [2023] EWCA Civ 379 (05 April 2023).
“[2]. …For reasons that do not matter on this appeal, the appellant commenced proceedings on 1 April 2019, in the employment tribunal, without first obtaining such leave.
[5] Although there are five grounds of appeal, it is common ground that there is essentially one question for determination by this court: what is the meaning and effect of section 42, and in particular, in a case to which it applies, where proceedings are brought without leave, does it operate as a jurisdictional or merely a procedural bar?
[8]. The term “any court” in section 42(1A) SCA 1981 has been held to extend to all inferior courts including tribunals. The term accordingly embraces employment tribunals.
[31] It follows that the tribunals below were correct to conclude that the employment tribunal proceedings commenced by the appellant without first obtaining the necessary leave of the High Court were and remain a nullity. For these reasons, which are essentially the same as those given by Eady P, the grounds of appeal cannot succeed. I [Lady Justice Simler] would dismiss this appeal accordingly”.
Lord Justice Popplewell and Lord Justice Baker concurred.
5 April 2023.
Vexatious litigation and tenure (in Law and religion round-up – 7th August 2022). In the late 1990s, the Revd Paul Williamson made several attempts to challenge the lawfulness of the ordination of women. See, for example, R (Williamson) v Dean & Chapter of St Paul’s Cathedral & Anor [1997] EWHC Admin 784. Finally, in R (Williamson) v HM Attorney General [1997] EWHC QB (16 July 1997) a Divisional Court concluded that he was a vexatious litigant and issued a Civil Proceedings Order (“CPO”) under S42(1) Senior Courts Act 1981.
In 2019, Fr Williamson sought to bring an age discrimination claim before an Employment Tribunal relating to the termination of his tenure as priest-in-charge of St George, Hanworth Park, when he had reached 70 in November 2018. In Williamson v The Bishop of London & Ors [2022] EAT 118 the EAT held that ET had correctly ruled that the proceedings before it were a nullity; section 42(1A) Senior Courts Act 1981 imposed a substantive barrier to the initiation of proceedings by the subject of a CPO, not merely a procedural one. Appeal dismissed. (7 August 2022).
Court hears objector to female bishops. (Behind the scenes of the installation of Rt Revd Sarah Mullally to the See of London). At 16.00 on Thursday 8 March 2018, the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Court of the Vicar General sat at the church of St Mary-le-Bow to confirm the election of the Rt Rev Sarah Mullally to the See of London. In a move to address any potential disruption by a frequent complainant to the ordination of women as bishops, on 6 March 2018 the Vicar General’s Court of the Southern Province sat to hear his views and to issue a Direction. Following the confirmation of her election, on 12 May 2018, The Rt Revd and Rt Hon Sarah Mullally DBE was installed as the 133rd Bishop of London at St Paul’s Cathedral. (21 May 2018).
Acclamation, assent and disruption. Further thoughts on objectors to women bishops and how the Church might respond, v infra. With regard to the interjection of objections…should these be considered as an interruption or disruption of the service, as generally portrayed in the media, or a legitimate part of it? […] It could be argued, therefore, that it is not illegal for an objection to be raised in response to the invitation of the Archbishop at this point in the service […]
Nevertheless, there seems to be little justification, other than the management of expected dissent, for the cathedral authorities to facilitate the delivery of an objection as indicated in the WATCH letter, particularly at any other point in the service. However, this leaves the authorities with the dilemma of how “things will be arranged differently”, without recourse to investigating the applicability of the heavy-handed legal options we discussed earlier. (25 July 2016).
Objectors to female bishops. On 20 July, WATCH (Women and the Church) issued a Press Release commenting on the presence of objectors at the consecration of female bishops, and hoping that at the next consecration of female bishops, “things will be arranged differently”. (21 July 2016). (v supra).
Contempt and ecclesiastical courts. The judgment Ewing v Crown Court Sitting at Cardiff & Newport & Ors [2016] EWHC 183, concerned the circumstances in which it was appropriate for a Crown Court judge to order that members of the public may not make notes of a hearing otherwise being held in public. The claimant, Terence Patrick Ewing, was a “vexatious litigant” and had been subject to a Civil Proceedings Order since 1989 [2].
S 81 Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 (Evidence and general powers and rights of courts and commissions), as amended, provides as follows: “(1) Any court or commission established under this Measure and the Vicar-General’s Court of each of the provinces of Canterbury and York shall have the same powers as the High Court in relation to the attendance and examination of witnesses and the production and inspection of documents.
On whether or not it is possible to contemn an ecclesiastical court. To which the answer is “yes”: see above. Moreover, that principle is of long standing: in R v Editor etc of Empire News and Davidson ex parte the Bishop of Norwich [1932] All ER 516, Lord Hewart [3] stated that “the justification is an inherent one, and just as this court may correct an inferior court such as the consistory court, so also in proper circumstances it may protect such a court.” However, it would appear that the court can only certify an act or omission where it would have been a contempt in relation to a secular court.
The term “any court” in section 42(1A) SCA 198, 1 has been held to extend to all inferior courts including tribunals. The term accordingly embraces employment tribunals, (10 February 2016).
Rt Revd Libby Lane consecrated at York Minster. A summary of the Press Comments is available on the CofE’s Daily Media Digest on 27 January. Thinking Anglicans suggests that some of them give undue prominence to the lone protester, The Rev Paul Williamson. Those who can recall R v Attorney-General ex parte Reverend Paul Stewart Williamson [1997] EWHC Admin 691 or Andrew Brown’s piece for The Independent in 1997 will know that we have been there before. Today the BBC reported “A Church of England spokesman said of Mr Williamson, priest in charge of a church in Hanworth, Middlesex: ‘He’s got the right to protest but the contrast was between a lone voice protesting and a sea of voices affirming.’” (26 January 2015).
Vexatious litigants and the consistory courts considered the practicalities and limitations of legislation dealing with vexatious litigants. In Re St George Hanworth [2016] ECC Lon 1, an application was made by the PCC for an injunction against the London Borough of Hounslow (“the Borough”) in relation to an area of land adjacent to the church known as Rectory Court (“the site”) which is registered at HM Land Registry as being in the ownership of the Borough. (8 February 2016).
Challenges to school admissions criteria and “vexatious litigation”. The Secretary of State for Education, Nicky Morgan, announced that the Government is to amend the rules relating to the Schools Admission Code in England, inter alia, by: “stopping ‘vexatious complaints against faith schools from secularist campaign groups’. We commented: “DfE seems to think that what ‘vexatious’ actually means is ‘damned annoying’. Moreover, if a particular school’s admission arrangements did not survive challenge then they must surely have been contrary to the DfE School Admission Code (or, in lawyer-speak, ‘illegal’)”. (26 January 2016).
Religion and law round-up – 21st June 2015. (“In the Courts” section). The Church Times reported that the Court of the Vicar-General of the Province of Canterbury dismissed the legal objection of the Priest-in-Charge of St George’s, Hanworth Park, London, the Revd Paul Stewart Williamson, to the election of the Archdeacon of Hackney, the Ven Rachel Treweek, as Bishop of Gloucester. Fr Williamson, who interjected during the ordination of the Revd Libby Lane as Bishop of Stockport, is well-known to canon lawyers as being declared a vexatious litigant in R v AG ex parte Reverend Paul Stewart Williamson [1997] EWHC Admin 691. The CT states that on 15 June 2015 the Court of the Vicar General debarred Fr Williamson from raising any further objection to the court. (21 June 2015).
[1] The term “vexatious” has specific meaning in law according to the context of its use. In most areas of UK administrative law, the complaint is vexatious, not the complainant. A person becomes a vexatious litigant only when the High Court issues a civil proceedings order restricting them from starting or continuing litigation without permission, S42 Senior Courts Act 1981. Their name will also be published in the London Gazette and included on the list of vexatious litigants which last updated 2 May 2025.
[2] A civil restraint order (CRO) is currently available as a remedy where an individual has been subjected to 2 or more unmeritorious claims or applications made against them by the same person and they relate to the same or similar matters. It is granted for a period up to 2 years, preventing the subject of it from taking certain steps as specified in the order, without first obtaining leave of a designated judge. CROs do not require the intervention of the Attorney General. It should be noted that the Employment Tribunal (ET) and Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) have their own rules.
[3] See Donald M. Gillmor, Free Press And Fair Trial In English Law, 22 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 17 (1965) at reference 5.