Warning: I found the facts of this case very distressing.
In Bains v Arsalan & Anor (Funeral Arrangements) [2026] EWHC 1597 (Fam), Harleen, a Sikh baby of unmarried Sikh parents, died in 2020 aged 2 months after suffering fatal injuries at home. In August 2022, her father committed suicide [1-4] after being falsely accused of Harleen’s murder by her mother, and in November 2022, Harleen’s mother was charged with her murder and was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 19 years. She converted to Islam and changed her name from Sharandeep Kaur Talwandi to Zara Arsalan. For six years, Harleen’s body remained in a mortuary under the responsibility of the Coroner’s Office [5-8].
In May 2026, the Coroner’s Office contacted a charitable bereavement service, Iqbal and Sons (the second respondent), with formal written instructions from Ms Arsalan to give Harleen an Islamic burial, followed by a Burial Order authorising release of the body. The burial application form referred incorrectly to Harleen’s religion as Islam “in circumstances where she had been born into the Sikh faith and remained so at her death” [9&10], and her paternal grandparents sought an injunction to halt the burial, contending that she should have a Sikh funeral [13].
It was argued on their behalf that, under the Forfeiture Act 1982, Harleen’s mother had no locus to apply for a grant of administration and, therefore, no right to determine burial arrangements, and that Harleen’s paternal grandmother should be granted letters of administration to carry out the funeral arrangements instead [18].
Peel J pointed out that it was long established that “the law recognises no property in a corpse”. Harleen had died intestate; Rule 22 of the Non Contentious Probate Rules 1987 (NCPR) listed the order of priority of those entitled to a grant of letters of administration for someone who died intestate and “(c) the father and mother of the deceased” came before “(f) grandparents” in that list [27]. The starting point was therefore that Harleen’s mother was entitled to a grant of administration to enable her to authorise arrangements for the body [28]. However, under s.116 of the Senior Courts Act 1981, the order of priority in the NCPR could be displaced if special circumstances made it necessary or expedient to do so [29], and he was satisfied that
“…by reason of the Forfeiture Act, and accepting as I do the submissions of counsel for the paternal grandmother, Harleen’s mother is not entitled to benefit from the estate of Harleen and, accordingly, is not entitled to apply for, or receive, a grant of administration under Rule 22 of the NCPR” [38].
Harleen’s mother was her closest biological relative, and he had “no reason to doubt her acceptance of Islamic faith and her wish for Harleen to be buried in accordance with Islamic tradition” [40]; however, it was Harleen’s mother who had murdered her, Harleen had been a Sikh, it was the wish of the paternal family and of her father when he was alive that she should be buried in accordance with the Sikh tradition, and none of the wider maternal family had expressed any desire to be involved, having disassociated themselves from Harleen’s mother [41].
And if he was wrong about that, he was satisfied that, under Rule 22 of the NCPR and the Forfeiture Act 1982, the fact that Harleen’s mother had killed Harleen “in horrific circumstances” and the fact that it was expedient to grant letters of administration to the paternal grandmother “to enable her to make the funeral arrangements in accordance with the Sikh faith, culture and tradition” were, taken together, special circumstances that weighed in favour of varying the order of priority [42].