Street preaching: hate speech vs freedom of expression: Sleeper

Background

In Sleeper v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2025] EWHC 151 (KB), Mr Ian Sleeper was a street preacher. In June 2017, he was preaching outside Southwark Cathedral and he had two large handwritten signs with him, reading “LOVE MUSLIMS BAN ISLAM THE RELIGION OF TERROR!” and “#LOVE MUSLIMS HATE ISLAM JESUS IS LOVE + HOPE”.

After refusing a request from police officers that he cease to display the signs, he was arrested and charged with a religiously aggravated offence under s.5 Public Order Act 1986. He maintained that his actions were protected under the Human Rights Act 1988. On 11 August 2017, he was informed of the Crown Prosecution Service’s decision not to prosecute [1-4]. He subsequently brought an unsuccessful claim against the Metropolitan Police for false imprisonment and breach of his human rights, arguing that his arrest and detention had been unlawful and violated his rights to freedom of religion, expression, and assembly under Articles 9, 10, and 11 ECHR [6].

 The grounds of appeal

On appeal, it was argued for Mr Sleeper:

  1. that the lower court had erred in finding that it was reasonable for the arresting officer to suspect that the sign was “abusive”;
  2. that his actions had been protected by Articles 9, 10, and 11 ECHR;
  3. that even if a proportionality exercise was not strictly required under common law, the trial judge had still erred in the way he assessed proportionality;
  4. that the trial judge had been wrong to the argument that saying “love Muslims” alongside “hate Islam” meant that the signs were not abusive and had misunderstood the distinction between criticising a religion and directing hatred towards individuals; and
  5. that the trial judge had been wrong to rule that Article 9 ECHR was not engaged.

The judgment

As to Ground 1, Sweeting J noted that the Judge at first instance had found that the words on the sign were likely to be perceived as abusive and to incite public disorder given that he was displaying the sign in Southwark shortly after the London Bridge and Finsbury Park terrorist attacks:

“The Hate sign was not expressed as a personal view held by the Appellant. Its message was not being argued in a debating chamber or developed in a polemical article. It was set out in headlines and called for those reading to respond by hating Islam just as the other sign called for the banning of that religion. It was not in my view perverse or contrary to the evidence for the Judge to determine that, in this context, exhorting people to ‘Hate Islam’ was likely to be perceived as hateful and abusive, would cause distress and carried with it a risk to public order” [69].

The lower court had been

“entitled to reject the argument that the Appellant could ‘hate the sin but love the sinner’ as negating any abusive meaning being attributed to the hate sign. The Judge’s decision was based on a careful assessment of the Appellant’s motivations, the specific wording on his signs, and the context in which they were displayed [70]. Further, the wording of s.5 Public Order Act 1986 “did not require an imminent risk to public order” [80].

As to Ground 2, the lower court had not failed to distinguish between protected and non-protected speech nor failed to recognise that even potentially abusive signage could be protected under Articles 10 and 11 [82].

On Ground 3, the arrest had not been disproportionate. Detention inherently began with arrest, so the lawfulness of the initial arrest rendered the subsequent detention lawful from the outset [121].

As to the contention in Ground 4 that the signs were not abusive and that the lower court had misunderstood the distinction between criticising a religion and directing hatred towards individuals,

“the Judge considered various factors beyond the sign’s wording, including the potential for disorder and the Appellant’s refusal to cooperate with less intrusive police requests. This was, on any view, a broader analysis that went beyond simply scrutinising the form of the protest [133].

Further:

“The judgment repeatedly acknowledges the Appellant’s Article 10 rights and the need to balance these rights against other interests. The Judge did, in fact, engage in a demonstrable balancing exercise. While he may not have explicitly articulated a precise weighting of the various factors, his reasoning is a nuanced evaluation of the Appellant’s rights against public order concerns. What was required was a practical and context-specific balancing exercise of the sort which the Judge clearly carried out” [134].

On Ground 5, the trial judge had concluded that

“the placard reading ‘Islam = Terrorism’ was intended to condemn an entire religion rather than represent a genuine manifestation of the Appellant’s own beliefs. A statement designed to promote hatred towards, and the suppression of, another religion is capable of falling outside the scope of Article 9 protection, even if made in the course of proselytising, because, in the context of this case, it is seeking an objective that is incompatible with Article 9(1), by preventing Muslims from being able to practise their faith (see Kokkinakis v Greece (1994) 17 EHRR 397” [143].

The lower court had not been wrong to conclude that Article 9 was not engaged, and in any event, Sweeting J was

“not persuaded that the Judge’s conclusion that Article 9 was not engaged had any material impact on the outcome of the case. Even if the Judge had considered Article 9 to be engaged, he would, in my view, have been bound to reach the same conclusion, namely that the arrest was lawful” [144].

In conclusion, the lower court had been entitled to find on the evidence that Mr Sleeper’s arrest and detention had been lawful: appeal dismissed [145].

Christian Concern has announced that Mr Sleeper intends to appeal.

Cite this article as: Frank Cranmer, "Street preaching: hate speech vs freedom of expression: Sleeper" in Law & Religion UK, 1 February 2025, https://lawandreligionuk.com/2025/02/01/street-preaching-hate-speech-vs-freedom-of-expression-sleeper/
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