The following guest post by Christopher Grozdoski revisits the case on religious discrimination, Billy Graham Evangelistic Association Against Scottish Event Campus Ltd [2022] SC GLW 33, in which the BGEA successfully sued a Scottish events provider for cancelling the letting of their premises.

Background

On 21 June 2025, Franklin Graham, the President and CEO of the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association (BGEA), announced the creation of a UK fund to support Christian organisations facing legal challenges. This follows a touchstone case on religious discrimination, Billy Graham Evangelistic Association Against Scottish Event Campus Ltd [2022] SC GLW 33 where the BGEA successfully sued a Scottish events provider for cancelling the letting of their premises.

Frank Cranmer wrote on this judgment nearer the time (When a unilateral cancellation amounts to discrimination: Billy Graham Evangelistic Association); three years later, and with the announcement of the UK fund, this article aims to revisit the touchstone case and give some broader commentary about its implications.

Revisiting the judgment

Glasgow City Council is the majority shareholder of the defendant, the Scottish Events Campus. At paragraph [23], court notes that the GCC board expressed concern surrounding Franklin Graham’s views on sexuality and Islam; “the message that was being preached which is darker than seen before”. More directly, the Chief Executive of Glasgow City Council explains the reason for cancelling the venue as follows:

“There is potential for Mr Graham to make homophobic and Islamophobic moments during his public speaking engagements. Among other concerns, this could raise issues for the council in terms of its duty under the Equality Act 2010 to eliminate discrimination, harassment, and victimisation and to foster good relations between different groups.

Secondly, I have a concern for the city’s reputation. Glasgow is well known as a city which is friendly to all people, but particularly including people from the LGBTQ and Muslim communities. I do not want to send a message to those communities that the council is prepared to welcome any person who has the potential to make such comments” [181]

In short, the BGEA’s event could potentially result in unlawful conduct or speech.

Two key issues arise: first, the board relied on potential risk, engaging in speculation about what Graham might say; second, there is the question of whether Graham’s views were unlawful in themselves, or whether they qualified as protected beliefs under s.10 Equality Act 2010.

The line between speculation and evidence

The above letter speaks about Graham’s “potential” [181] to say something unlawful. We hear concerns from the board about a “darker message” [23], and other speculative concerns. These concerns were not backed up by evidence.

Susan Aitken, Leader of the GCC, told the court the event’s content was judged from public emails and political pressure, not credible evidence such as past BGEA transcripts [153, 156]. Likewise, Pauline Ann-Lafferty likewise admitted assumptions about the Event were “based on no evidence, no investigation and were just speculation” [P.9.17].

In R (Ben-Dor) v University of Southampton [2016] EWHC 953 (Admin), concerning a case where a university withdrew permission for an academic conference after risk assessments indicated a high likelihood of disorder and little time to mitigate.

In BGEA, the venue acted on speculation and public pressure, not on concrete evidence that the event would involve unlawful content or create a legally cognisable risk. In Ben-Dor, Whipple J (as she then was) dismissed the JR application, whose decision was based on serious credible evidence. (Arden LJ had granted permission to bring the claim after a refusal by Judge Alice Robinson). [See also Comments of David Lamming].

The irony in this case is that the defendant stumbled at the first hurdle, failing to even make an argument that Graham’s speeches were unlawful.

The lawfulness of BGEA’s views

There is little doubt that the BGEA and Franklin Graham is a conservative Christian organisation whose views are deemed controversial by a section of civil society. However, the judgment of Sheriff McCormick is clear:

“The lawful opinions of others based here on religious or philosophical belief (whether mainstream or not) are not to be preferred one over another. All are protected” [188].

While not utilised by Sheriff McCormick in this case, there is a great volume of legal commentary on the Grainger Criteria (set out in Grainger Plc & Ors v Nicholson [2009] UKEAT 0219/09/0311) which would be invaluable in analysing the case.

The final criterion, “It must be worthy of respect in a democratic society, not be incompatible with human dignity and not conflict with the fundamental rights of others” [24], is the only one engaged in the defendant’s argument, as they do not dispute the religious nature of the BGEA.

In Maya Forstater v CGD Europe and Others UKEAT/0105/20/JOJ concerning gender critical views, the Employment Appeal Tribunal held that these views were protected under the Equality Act 2010. Choudhury J provides a very narrow definition of these laws, identifying only “Totalitarianism”, “Nazism” or “espousing violence and hatred in the gravest of forms” should meet this final criterion [110]. The conservative stance of the BGEA, while upsetting to a section of society, clearly does not meet this criterion.

As an aside, s.29(8) Equality Act 2010 explicitly provides an exclusion to claims of harassment concerning religion or belief, or sexual orientation. Again, while not engaged by Sheriff McCormick, it would be very difficult for the SEC to argue a statutory basis of discrimination on grounds of islamophobia or homophobia.

The lawfulness of the BGEA’s event is very clear. The defendant had given lip service to the Equality Act 2010 and a desire to prevent discrimination, but had neither made reasonable steps to work out what Graham was preaching, nor identify whether his views were a valid ground for cancellation.

Sheriff McCormick notes the absurdity of the defendant’s argument at [182]:

“In my view, the defender’s decision to terminate was not based on any sound legal or evidential foundation but rather was a thinly veiled exercise in virtue signalling, made under pressure from the objectors and the majority shareholder.”

Comment

The Billy Graham Evangelistic Association case raises nuanced issues, especially given the rise in venue cancellations from within and without the sphere of religion and law. At its core, the case is straightforward: the defendant acted discriminatorily, made no effort to understand what they were cancelling, and Sheriff McCormick’s judgment was clear and firm.

However, it raises concerns. The BGEA had the size and resources to challenge government, unlike many smaller religious groups. Why is such clear discrimination still happening? And why are public bodies like the Glasgow Council persisting in discriminatory actions against religion?

The BGEA’s UK fund is certainly a welcome one, offering much-needed support and highlighting the gaps that still exist in this area of law.

Cite this article as: Christopher Grozdoski, “Revisiting the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association Case and its legacy” in Law & Religion UK, 9 September 2025, https://lawandreligionuk.com/2025/09/09/revisiting-the-billy-graham-evangelistic-association-case-and-its-legacy/.