In Smith & Anor v Manchester City Council [2025] EWHC 2987 (KB) the claimants, a married couple with strong evangelical Christian beliefs, wanted to foster children; however, their application did not progress beyond the first stage of the Council’s suitability assessment. One reason was that the social workers examining it concluded that they would find it “quite difficult to be proactive in promoting a diverse view of the world” [1]. They were particularly concerned about the claimants’ belief that homosexuality and abortion were wrong and their gender-critical views, and the possibility that they might express such views to any children entrusted to their care [2]. The couple took proceedings in the Manchester County Court claiming remedies under the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Equality Act 2010, but were unsuccessful [3 & 4], and appealed.

They set out their religious and moral views at [8]:

• the Christian religion: belief in the binary nature of men and women and therefore a lack of belief in “gender fluidity”;
• belief in marriage as a divinely instituted life-long union between one man and one woman; the truth of the Bible;
• belief that “although [they] may disagree with persons from different faiths and/or sexual minority lifestyles and/or persons choosing to transition their gender, they must be loving and show love to such individuals and not be judgmental to such persons”;
• belief in the sanctity of life “from conception to natural death, and opposition to abortion”;
• lack of belief in “diversity”, understood as an ethical requirement to promote and celebrate a wide variety of faiths, sexual lifestyles, gender identities, and life choices; and
• the Christian duty to bear witness in words and deeds.

Their own children were and/or had been home-schooled using a curriculum based on the Accelerated Christian Education (“ACE”) programme [11].

After investigation, the social workers assigned to their case rejected their application for the following reasons: they had a busy household with three young children, home-schooling of the Smiths’ own children “could be a problem for a looked-after child who was required to attend school”, and, given their views, they would find it “quite difficult to be proactive in promoting that diverse view of the world which is what we’re after really in our foster carers” [28].

Mr and Mrs Smith brought a claim against the Council under s.7(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998, alleging a breach of Articles 9 and 10 ECHR, and under s.29(6) of the Equality Act 2010. In the County Court, HHJ Sephton KC had agreed that their Article 9 rights were engaged and interfered with, but had found that the interference was justified – and their claim for direct discrimination therefore failed [50].

Their appeal was dismissed. On the issue of proportionality, Turner J made the following points at [78]. His judgment was not to be construed as deciding that Evangelical Christian beliefs were generally incompatible with suitability to foster children, and there was “abundant evidence of their impressive parenting skills and commitment to the welfare of children in their care”. That did not mean, however, that the Council’s decision had been flawed. Where a court reasonably apprehended some incompatibility between the Article 9 rights of potential foster parents and the welfare of children to be placed in their care, the latter was the paramount consideration. While there would be cases in which the manifestation of the religion of potential foster parents might be seen as being of positive benefit to children “by way, for example, of providing consistency and continuity with the faith in which they have hitherto been brought up”, local authorities and other agencies had to remain vigilant to consider any ways in which the manifestation of the religious beliefs of particular prospective foster parents might affect the welfare of the child, and the court had to give “due deference to the expertise and experience of the social workers exercising their professional judgment”.