In a guest post, Professor Russell Sandberg looks at the judgment of the Supreme Court  on religious education in Northern Ireland, what it actually says, and what the impact may be.

The Supreme Court decision JR87, Re Application for Judicial Review [2025] UKSC 40  has already attracted considerable interest and has been used to support wider calls for reform of the law on religion in schools in Northern Ireland and beyond. It is undoubtedly an important judgment. However, it is somewhat narrower and more technical than it might appear from the headlines.

The judgment confirms that where the teaching of religion is not objective, critical and pluralistic, then this amounts to indoctrination that is contrary to human rights law and that the existence of a right to opt out of such learning would not necessarily justify this.

The Background

The case was brought by a young girl, anonymised as JR87, and her father, anonymised as G, challenging the religious education and religious worship at the primary school that JR87 had attended in Northern Ireland. They alleged breach of Article 2 of protocol 1 (given the Star Wars sounding acronym ‘A2P1’) to the European Convention on Human Rights read with Article 9.

Religious education is compulsory in grant-aided schools in Northern Ireland under Article 21(1) of the Education and Libraries (Northern Ireland) Order 1986 (SI 1986/594 (NI 3)). Article 21(3A) provides that religious education must include ‘religious education in accordance with any core syllabus specified under article 11 of the Education (Northern Ireland) Order 2006’.  Article 11 provides that a core syllabus ‘sets out certain core matters, skills and processes which are to be included in the teaching of religious education to pupils in such schools, but does not prevent or restrict the inclusion of any other matter, skill or process in that teaching’. The core syllabus is drafted by a drafting group consisting only of representatives of the ‘four main churches’: the Catholic Church, the Church of Ireland, the Presbyterian Church in Ireland, and the Methodist Church in Ireland.  The current core syllabus is mandated under the Education (Core Syllabus for Religious Education) Order (Northern Ireland) 2007 (NISR No 309 of 2007).

In the words of Lord Stephens, who gave the Supreme Court judgment to which the other Lords agreed, the working party behind the core syllabus had ‘considered that its Christian duty in drafting the core syllabus was the development of the Christian faith in young people rather than imparting knowledge about Christianity’ [[2025] UKSC 40, para 79]. The core syllabus makes no reference to any faiths other than Christianity until secondary education and it ‘is exclusively based on promoting faith in Christianity without any education about any other world religion’ –even at secondary school it was ‘intended that study of the World Faiths will require only a modest amount of teaching time’.

The primary school that JR87 attended followed and delivered the core syllabus [23].  This was true not only of religious education but of collective worship, which took place at assemblies and met the requirements of the core syllabus [25].  The Principal accepted that religious education and worship was not confined to the classroom and assemblies but that some individual teachers said prayers before snack time, for instance [24].  The only external persons invited to give religious education were either Christian religious ministers or representatives from Christian organisations [26].

The parents of JR87 became concerned when, despite the absence of any religion at home, their daughter began to repeat and practice a prayer she was taught at school at snack time and now believed that God made the world [32]. G’s concern was that ‘his daughter is learning Christianity and not learning “about” Christianity in a school context that effectively assumes its absolute truth and which encourages her to do the same’.  The parents were aware of their right to opt their child out but ‘they did not feel this was an adequate answer to their concerns but rather exposed that the root cause of the problem was the complete lack of religious and belief diversity within the education system’.

Their challenge was successful at the High Court: [2022] NIQB 53.  Colton J held that the religious education and worship following the core syllabus was not conveyed in an objective, critical and pluralistic manner and that this infringed human rights laws despite a right to opt out because that placed an undue burden on parents and ran the risk of stigmatising their children (see my earlier blog post).  The Court of Appeal, however, reversed this: [2024] NICA 34. Treacy LJ accepted that religious education and worship had not been conveyed in an objective, critical and pluralistic manner but held that the right to opt out meant that there was no breach of human rights law.  The State was not pursuing the forbidden aim of indoctrination and the fears of the burden and stigma would not have been realised in practice.

The Core Syllabus  

JR87 and G were given permission to appeal to the Supreme Court. The Department of Education in Northern Ireland cross-appealed, challenging the finding that the religious education curriculum was not conveyed in an objective, critical, and pluralistic manner and that the judge had failed to separately analyse and determine the claims made by both JR87 and G [[2025] UKSC 40, para 7]. Only the second cross-appeal was permitted, and so the Supreme Court was not asked to determine the question of whether the core syllabus was objective, critical and pluralistic [8].

Nevertheless, Lord Stephens outlined the main reasons why the core syllabus did not convey religious education in an objective, critical, and pluralistic manner [84]:  the fact that the drafting was by the four churches, who sought ‘to promote faith in Christianity as an absolute truth rather than knowledge about Christianity.’ [85]; ‘the complete absence of plurality in relation to the teachings or practices of any other religions or non-religious traditions and philosophies’ before secondary school age’ [86]; and the lack of any ‘commitment in the core syllabus to objectivity or to the development of critical thought’ [88]. As Lord Stephens noted: ‘To teach pupils to accept a set of beliefs without critical analysis amounts to evangelism, proselytising, and indoctrination. He stressed, however, that he used the word ‘indoctrination’ ‘as a synonym for evangelism and proselytising devoid of any negative connotations’ [10].

He concluded that ‘the core syllabus does not convey religious education in an objective, critical, and pluralistic manner has been accepted in this court by the Transferors’ Representative Council, which now seeks a review of the core syllabus in which the study of other faiths would be mandatory from the Foundation Stage of the Northern Ireland curriculum’ [89].

The reasoning here is clearly particular to the education system in Northern Ireland. As Lord Stephens noted at the start of his speech: ‘The proceedings involve wide and important points of law which affect not only JR87, G, and the School, but also the teaching of religious education and the practice of collective worship more generally in Northern Ireland’ [1]. Whether the findings in respect of whether religious education and worship are conveyed in an objective, critical and pluralistic manner could apply in the other nations of the United Kingdom will depend on whether the reasoning summarised above is applicable. This is more likely to be so in relation to laws on collective worship than religious education.

Parental Opt Outs

However, the Supreme Court decision is of most interest probably in Northern Ireland and definitely elsewhere in terms of what it says about the matter that the appeal hinged upon: whether the right to opt out necessarily provides an answer to a human rights breach.  The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court and reinstated the declaration made by Colton J.  In so doing, the Supreme Court corrected the reasoning of the Court of Appeal and made it plain that teaching that is not objective, critical and pluralistic will breach human rights laws even if there is a right to opt out and even where that right has not been exercised.

Reviewing the Strasbourg authorities, Lord Stephen noted that the right to opt out was ‘one factor’ that the Court had taken into account in terms of assessing whether there has been a breach of A2P1 [97].  However, he concluded that the Strasbourg understanding of the right to opt out had been misinterpreted by the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal had erred in regarding indoctrination as being something different from conveying information or knowledge in a manner which was not objective, critical, and pluralistic [103, 122].  Strasbourg treated the two as ‘simply different sides of the same coin’ [104, 122]. There was no requirement to prove that the State was pursuing an aim of indoctrination since that would ‘make the rights of parents and pupils theoretical and illusory’ [107, 123].

Moreover, in assessing whether there is a breach of A2P1, a factor to take into account is whether there is a right to opt out ‘without placing an undue burden’ on the parents [116].   Lord Stephens noted that: ‘If the right of withdrawal is capable of placing an undue burden on them, then their rights and the rights of JR87 under A2P1 read with article 9 ECHR would be theoretical and illusory rather than practical and effective’.  Again, the Court of Appeal had erred in interpreting this.  There was no requirement to prove that the concerns raised by the parents in relation to the opt out were ’objectively made out’ or ‘would have been realised in practice’ [127].  The High Court judge had made a factual finding that the concerns raised by the parents in relation to the opt out were valid [118] and it was not for the Court of Appeal to depart from this factual finding given that it is only in exceptional circumstances that an appellate court should reverse a finding by a trial judge on a question of fact [128].

Although this might suggest that much depends on the facts, the Supreme Court’s judgment suggests that an opt-out from religious education and worship that is not objective, critical and pluralistic will rarely render it human rights compliant.  It is now clear that an opt-out will not be sufficient if it is capable of unduly burdening the parents.  Lord Stephens held that there was ‘ample evidence’ that the parents’ concerns in this case were valid and that it ‘was also the only available finding open to him on the evidence’[118].  There ‘was no evidence from the School that JR87 would not be stigmatised’ and the evidence of stigmatisation is consistent with peer pressure and classroom norms to which children are inevitably exposed and to which they are sensitive’.  This would seem to apply in most cases, suggesting that the existence of an opt-out will rarely excuse teaching that amounts to indoctrination. However,  weight also seems to have been placed upon the fact that ‘JR87 would have been the only child withdrawn from religious education and collective worship’ and ‘this was a small school environment’.

Concluding Thoughts

At an early point in the Supreme Court judgment, Lord Stephens stressed what this case was not about: ‘this case is not about secularism in the education system. No one is suggesting that religious education should not be provided in schools in Northern Ireland. Rather,

JR87 and G strongly support the provision of religious education, provided it does not amount to indoctrination’ [12]; it is also ‘not about whether Christianity should be the main or primary faith that pupils learn about in schools in Northern Ireland’ and the focus of collective worship since this remains within the Department’s margin of appreciation [14-16].

The case is also not really about whether the core syllabus was not objective, critical or pluralistic, since the ground against the finding that there was a breach was not given permission to appeal.  The High Court and Court of Appeal agreed on that point, and the core syllabus clearly needs revising or supplementing.

The Supreme Court decision is, however, about the right to withdraw and whether opt-outs for parents can excuse teaching that is otherwise not human rights compliant.  In this respect, it is an important decision in Northern Ireland and beyond – especially where considerable reliance is based on the existence of opt-outs and where such opt-outs might be as ‘theoretical and illusory’ as those complained of in this case.  This is arguably true of the law on collective worship in schools in most, if not all, of the nations of the UK. The Supreme Court decision could be said to vindicate the decision in Wales to insist upon critical, objective and pluralistic teaching on religion in schools without a religious character and the removal of the parental opt outs in such schools, though the position of schools with a religious character where opt outs have been retained precisely because such teaching is not critical, objective and pluralistic may now come into question. Although the findings as to the core syllabus are specific to Northern Ireland, there is much that is of wider application.

This is true of the quickly disposed of cross-appeal that the first instance judge ‘erred in failing to separately analyse and determine the claims made by both JR87 and G’ [131]. In dismissing the cross-appeal, Lord Stephens stated that the jurisprudence was ‘clear’ that:

‘(a) both parents and children are holders of the right to freedom of religion under article 9 ECHR; (b) the rights guaranteed by A2P1 when read with article 9 ECHR are not limited to parental rights; (c) the first sentence of A2P1 must be read in the light of the second sentence of that provision and article 9 ECHR; (d) when read in that way, the first sentence of A2P1 guarantees schoolchildren the right to education in a form which respects their right to believe or not to believe’ [137]

These points support arguments made in recent years that the religious rights of children are not properly protected, as seen by calls in Scotland and elsewhere to give pupils the right to opt out of religious education and collective worship.  This point has also been made in relation to claims where the rights of pupils to wear religious dress or pray at school have been rejected by the domestic courts on the basis that the parents had chosen the school in question and so the pupil must comply with the school rules or go elsewhere. This underscores that, although this Supreme Court decision is perhaps narrower and more technical than many of the initial headlines suggested, it is nevertheless an important decision not only in correcting the errors of the Court of Appeal, clarifying the impact of opt outs, but also in terms of the language, tone and arguments of the judgment that should inspire a review of the law on religion in schools not only in Northern Ireland but in all of the nations of the UK.

Cite this article as: Russell Sandberg, “Religious Education in Northern Ireland: the Supreme Court Decision and its impact” in Law & Religion UK, 19 November 2025, [URL]