Background

Mr Mond had been a trustee of various Jewish charities [11]. As a result of various postings on social media [12-15], for which he subsequently apologised by way of a press statement [16], the Commission disqualified him from being a charity trustee for three years under its powers under s.181A Charities Act 2011 [20 & 21]. He appealed against his disqualification.

In Mond v The Charity Commission for England and Wales [2025] UKFTT 103 (GRC), he argued that the Commission had been wrong to characterise his posts as Islamophobic; his intention had been to demonstrate a concern about Islamist fundamentalism and not about Islam generally [42], and it was submitted on his behalf that the Commission’s Order amounted to an unjustified interference with his freedom of expression under the ECHR and s.6 Human Rights Act 1998. The Commission accepted that his Article 10 right to freedom of expression was infringed by the Order but argued that its powers to restrict freedom of expression were exercisable if it was “necessary in a democratic society” to do so. The protection of charities and the charitable sector was a pressing social need that could make such restrictions necessary [68], and his disqualification was therefore proportionate [71-72].

The judgment

The Tribunal found that his conduct on social media had been

“capable of damaging public trust and confidence in charities of which he was a trustee, but … was not sufficient in itself to establish that he is unfit to be a charity trustee or that it was desirable in the public interest for the Order to be made” [93].

The Order had not been “necessary and proportionate in the circumstance of this appeal” [95]. Mr Mond appeared “to have understood that his 2014 and 2016 posts, as written, had the potential to be damaging to public trust and confidence in charities of which he was a trustee” but had also “consistently sought to deny that he is Islamophobic”  and had “acted responsibly in stepping down from all charity trustee roles” [95].

While his conduct on social media was neither “condoned nor excused”, his posts and “likes” on social media were not

“sufficient evidence in themselves of unfitness to be a charity trustee, nor … to establish that a disqualification order is proportionate or desirable in the public interest in order to protect public trust and confidence in charities generally or in certain charities or a class or classes of charity that may be specified or described in a modified order” [95].

The Charity Commission’s Order was quashed [99]; however, the Tribunal added this rider:

“Nothing in this decision should prevent the Commission from considering the whole of Mr Mond’s social media and broadcasting comments and conduct, including the past conduct considered in this appeal, if subsequent public statements that he makes lead it to consider his fitness to hold a position as a charity trustee and whether it would be in the public interest for him to do so” [96].

Comment: According to Civil Society, this is the first occasion on which a Charity Commission disqualification order has been overturned on appeal.