A week in which the US Supreme Court demonstrated that the separation of powers is not entirely dead…
Places of Worship Renewal Fund
Further details continue to emerge about the operation of the Places of Worship Renewal Fund. In answer to a written question from Freddie van Mierlo (Henley and Thame, Lib Dem), the Minister of State at DCMS, Ian Murray, said this:
“The Places of Worship Renewal Fund will provide an equivalent overall level of financial support to that provided by the Listed Places of Worship Grant Scheme, £23 million per annum.
The new Places of Worship Renewal Fund is a capital fund providing grants upfront, which in some cases, may award a greater proportion of the project costs than what would have previously been received through the Listed Places of Worship Grant Scheme.
We are aware of concerns regarding the transition between the two schemes. Guidance, including eligibility criteria and application process on the new Places of Worship Renewal Fund, will be published in due course.”
It should be remembered that the new Fund is for England only; Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales will need to make their own domestic arrangements to support listed places of worship. The Listed Places of Worship Grant Scheme closed to new applications on 18 February because all the funding in the 2025/2026 budget had been allocated.
Reform of religious education in Scotland
On Tuesday, the Children (Withdrawal from Religious Education and Amendment of UNCRC Compatibility Duty) (Scotland) Bill, introduced to clarify the legal position on the withdrawal of pupils from religious observance in schools, was passed in a final stage three vote at the Scottish Parliament. The changes will align the relevant legislation with existing guidance on religious observance to strengthen alignment with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). Once brought into effect, it will strengthen pupils’ rights in relation to religious observance and religious and moral education (RME). The Bill was amended at Stage 2 to separate religious observance from religious and moral education in relation to the pre-existing parental right to withdraw. As a result of the change, the parental right to withdraw a child will only apply to religious observance, and it will no longer be possible to withdraw from RME. Russell Sandberg comments here.
Hamit Coskun again
Last October, we reported on the judgment in R v Hamit Coskun [2025] Southwark Crown Court 10 October, in which Mr Coskun appealed against his conviction for an offence under s.5 Public Order Act 1986, enhanced by the aggravation provisions of s.31 Crime and Disorder Act 1998: setting fire to a copy of the Quran outside the Turkish Consulate in London. Bennathan J upheld his appeal, on the grounds that the Prosecution had not demonstrated satisfactorily either that Mr Coskun’s conduct could properly be found to be disorderly or that it was within the hearing or sight of a person who was likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress.
The Crown Prosecution Service appealed and, according to the BBC report, at the hearing last week, David Perry KC argued for the CPS that “Burning a book in a residential or commercial part of central London, between Knightsbridge and Hyde Park, is in itself disorderly and even more so when the book is a holy text, whatever the religion.”Judgment was reserved.
Note: Subsections (4) and (8) of s.66 Criminal Justice Act 2003 provide that, when the Court of Appeal reverses or varies a ruling, it must either order a resumption of the Crown Court proceedings or a fresh trial, or order the acquittal of the defendant(s) for the offence(s) under appeal. By virtue of subsections (5) and (8), the Court of Appeal will only order the resumption of the Crown Court proceedings or a fresh trial where it considers it necessary in the interests of justice to do so. [With thanks to Wikicrimeline.]
Appointment of Bishop of Durham
On Thursday, it was announced that the new Bishop of Durham is to be the current Archdeacon of Auckland, the Ven Richard Simpson, in succession to Bishop Paul Butler. On election, the Bishop of Durham becomes one of the Lords Spiritual ex officio, and will be a member of the House of Lords after his introduction to the Upper House.
Quick links
- Elaine Sutherland, Scottish Legal News: Let’s not raise the minimum age for marriage and civil partnership – at least, not yet: a rather different take on the Scottish Government’s current proposals.
- Jakob Gašperin Wischhoff & Till Stadtbäumer (eds), Verfassungsblog: In Good Faith: Freedom of Religion under Article 10 of the EU Charter.
And finally…
The Times of Malta reports that the Vatican has dissolved St Peter’s Monastery, in Mdina, and appointed a Benedictine abbot to take control of “administrative matters related to the property”. The last resident is Mother Abbess Sr Maria Adeodata dei Marchesi Testaferrata De Noto; and the Vatican is accusing her of having “unilaterally signed, without authorisation, two 50-year leases on the property to private individuals – each for a fee of less than €2,000 per month”. The Vatican apparently told the Archdiocese of Malta that the leases signed by the abbess were invalid “due to non-observance of the regime of canonical authorisations”, and attempts by the Archbishop to resolve the matter were unsuccessful. [With thanks to Mark Hill KC.]
And you thought the faculty jurisdiction was complicated?
A couple of comments.
First, with regard to the appeal hearing in R v Coskun, section 66 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 has no application in this case. That section (in Part 9 of the 2003 Act) deals with orders the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) may make when, on an appeal by the prosecution pursuant to that Part, it reverses a ruling made by a Crown Court judge in relation to trial on indictment. Although, unusually, a High Court judge (Bennathan J) presided, the case in Southwark Crown Court in the Coskun case was not a trial on indictment but an appeal by Mr Coskun against his conviction by a District Judge in the magistrates’ court, with the proceedings in the Crown Court being by way of rehearing, with Bennathan J sitting with two lay justices: see para 27 of the Crown Court judgment, “An appeal to the Crown Court such as this is by way of rehearing. We therefore are not required to examine the decision of the Judge in the Magistrates’ Court: That is a matter of basic procedure and implies no disrespect to the District Judge who heard the trial.”
Accordingly, the appeal by the CPS from the Crown Court decision was not to the Court of Appeal, but by Case Stated to the High Court pursuant to section 28 of the Senior Courts Act 1981. This provides (in section 28(1)): “Subject to subsection (2), any order, judgment or other decision of the Crown Court may be questioned by any party to the proceedings, on the ground that it is wrong in law or is in excess of jurisdiction, by applying to the Crown Court to have a case stated by that court for the opinion of the High Court.” Subsection (2) provides, “Subsection (1) shall not apply to—(a) a judgment or other decision of the Crown Court relating to trial on indictment.” So the two appeal routes are exclusive.
In this case the High Court sat as a Divisional Court of the King’s Bench division, comprising Lord Justice Warby and Mrs Justice Obi. If the appeal is allowed, on the basis that Bennathan J and the two justices got the law wrong, the case will be sent back to the Crown Court for reconsideration. The jurisdiction is similar to that of the High Court when hearing an appeal by Case Stated from a magistrates’ court pursuant to section 111 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980; prosecution appeals under that section are common, whereas those from a Crown Court under section 28 of the 1980 Act are fairly rare.
(If the High Court certifies a point of law of general public importance, and either that court or the Supreme Court grant permission, the High Court’s ruling could end up being considered by the Supreme Court.)
(Incidentally, Mrs Justice Obi, a former defence solicitor and the first black female High Court judge, who became a High Court judge on 3 October 2025, is perhaps more well known as the Acting Judge of the Supreme Court of the British Indian Ocean Territory who ruled in December 2024 in favour of Sri Lankan Tamil migrants who claimed that they had been unlawfully detained on Diego Garcia.)
Second, a comment on the Vatican ruling that ‘leases signed by the abbess [of St Peter’s Monastery] were invalid “due to non-observance of the regime of canonical authorisations”’. A similar ‘ruling’, albeit obiter, was given by HH Judge Nigel Seed KC when giving judgment in the London Consistory Court in Re St George, Hanworth [2016] ECC Lon 1; 18 Ecc LJ 383. During the hearing in January 2016 it emerged that the priest in charge, the Revd Paul Williamson, had, purportedly as incumbent of the benefice, granted an easement to Thames Water Utilities Ltd to lay a water pipe across the churchyard in consideration of a premium of £10,000. At paragraph 25 of his judgment, dated 2 February 2016, Chancellor Seed said: “Shortly before the hearing the Registry on my behalf checked the up-to-date position of the two registered titles together comprising the site and curtilage of St George’s Church and Hall. This revealed a Deed of Grant entered in to on 11 April 2014 between Fr Williamson (purporting to be Incumbent and not, as he actually is, Priest-in-Charge) and Thames Water Utilities Ltd. I pointed out that this Deed is ultra vires and void because, firstly, no Faculty was granted, secondly, Fr Williamson is not Incumbent and, thirdly, it is not possible to grant a legal easement over consecrated land in the absence of a Scheme by the Church Commissioners or other express statutory authority.” The chancellor added (at para 28): “This unauthorised action by Fr Williamson is wholly inconsistent with the contention by him and his PCC as to the inalienability of consecrated land. Although not directly affecting the site vested in the Borough [Hounslow LBC], it is seriously damaging to the credibility of the PCC’s already weak case. It may also be a disciplinary matter.”
Thank you: I found the procedural background to the appeal incredibly difficult to understand. I’ve corrected lines 1-2 as you asked.